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ALD-251        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2310 
 ___________ 
 
 IN RE:  ARTHUR D’AMARIO, III, 
        Petitioner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
 United States District Court for the District of New Jersey  
 (Related to D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-5468) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
July 28, 2011 
 Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed : August 18, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 On May 11, 2011, Arthur D’Amario, III, filed this pro se petition for a writ of 
mandamus, seeking to compel the disqualification of Judge Paul S. Diamond, who, 
pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 292(b), is presiding over D’Amario’s collateral attack proceedings 
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.1
                                                 
1  Although D’Amario filed this mandamus petition in May 2011, he did not pay 
the associated filing fee, and he did not move to proceed in forma pauperis until mid-
July.  That motion was granted on July 19, 2011.  
 
  D’Amario also 
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requests that we “order [his] immediate release.”  For the reasons given below, we 
decline to take either course of action.  The mandamus petition will be denied. 
I. 
 D’Amario filed pro se motions under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
to challenge his December 2006 conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115.  D’Amario 
raised twenty-six grounds for relief.  After the Government filed its answer, D’Amario 
requested that counsel be appointed.  By order dated May 3, 2010, Judge Diamond 
appointed attorney Gil Scutti to represent D’Amario.  Judge Diamond then denied 
D’Amario’s pro se Rule 33(a) and § 2255 motions without prejudice to his right to file 
those motions anew with the assistance of appointed counsel.   
 Scutti, on behalf of D’Amario, adopted and filed a supplement to D’Amario’s two 
primary motions.  The Government filed a brief in response, and Scutti filed a reply.  
Scutti also moved for D’Amario’s “immediate release” pending disposition of the § 2255 
proceeding.  By order dated May 17, 2011, Judge Diamond denied the motion for 
immediate release and denied D’Amario’s pro se recusal motion.  On June 21, 2011, a 
hearing was held on D’Amario’s applications.  Judge Diamond permitted the parties 
thirty days, following receipt of the hearing’s transcript, to file proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.  The parties were permitted thirty days after that to file 
“memoranda in rebuttal.”  By our account, D’Amario’s collateral attack proceedings are 
moving along at an appropriate pace. 
II. 
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 Mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in the most extraordinary of 
circumstances.  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  A 
mandamus petitioner must demonstrate the following three requirements before a court 
can consider whether to issue the writ:  “(1) no other adequate means exist to attain the 
relief he desires, (2) [his] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) 
the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.”  Hollingsworth v. Perry, --- U.S. ---, 130 
S. Ct. 705, 710 (2010) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted).  In 
addition, we have stated that “[m]andamus is a proper means for this court to review a 
district court judge’s refusal to recuse from a case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), where 
the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  Alexander v. Primerica 
Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993).      
III. 
 As noted at the outset, with his mandamus petition D’Amario requests that this 
Court both “remove” Judge Diamond and “order [D’Amario’s] immediate release.”2
                                                 
2  D’Amario also complains in passing that he “commenced the action 10/19/09, 
and the judge has declined to adjudicate it.”  The complaint is unfounded.  As our 
recitation of its procedural history should indicate, D’Amario’s case is progressing and 
we have no doubt that a resolution will be arrived at in due course.  Cf. Madden v. Myers, 
102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting our concern with the district court’s four months 
of inaction, but denying the mandamus petition because the adjudicatory delay did “not 
yet rise to the level of a denial of due process”).    
 
  
Judge Diamond denied substantively similar requests in his May 11, 2011 order.  
 Because an order denying bail or interim release can be appealed prior to the 
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culmination of collateral attack proceedings, see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 835 F.2d 
1048 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Swann, 194 F.3d 1307 (4th Cir. 1999), it cannot be 
said that D’Amario has no other recourse save mandamus.  It is well-settled that the writ 
is not to be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process.  Cheney v. U.S. Dist. 
Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004).   
 Furthermore, D’Amario’s request for disqualification of Judge Diamond, 
supported only by a litany of pejoratives3
                                                 
3  D’Amario states that he “just obtained BOP documents under FOIA,” which 
reveal that Judge Diamond “asked the NJ Secret Service to indict me on a specious 
charge of ‘threatening’ him.”  But D’Amario did not attach the purported BOP 
documents.    
, is insufficient to demonstrate that “a 
reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s 
impartiality might reasonable be questioned.”  In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 
301 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“judicial 
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”).  
Therefore, D’Amario’s right to relief in that regard is not “clear and indisputable.”    
 Accordingly, D’Amario’s petition for a writ of mandamus will be denied.  
